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Abstract
Real-time control skills are ordinarily tacit | their possessors
cannot explicitly communicate them. But given sucient sam-
pling of a trained expert's input{output behaviour, machine
learning programs have been found capable of constructing rules
which, when run as programs, deliver behaviours similar to those
of the original exemplars. These `clones' are in eect symbolic
representations of subcognitive behaviours.
After validation on simple pole-balancing tasks, the princi-
ples have been successfully generalized in ight-simulator exper-
iments, both by Sammut and others at UNSW, and by Camacho
at the Turing Institute. A ight plan switches control through
a sequence of logically concurrent sets of reactive behaviours.
Each set can be thought of as a committee of subpilots who are
respectively specialized for rudder, elevators, rollers, thrust, etc.
The chairman (the ight plan) knows only the mission sequence,
and how to recognize the onset of each stage.
This treatment is essentially that of the `blackboard model',
augmented by machine learning to extract subpilot behaviours
(seventy-two behaviours in Camacho's auto-pilot for a simulated
F-16 combat plane). A `clean-up' eect, rst noted in the pole-
balancing phase of this enquiry, results in auto-pilots which y
the F-16 under tighter control than the human from whom the
behavioural records were sampled.
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Table 15.1. Criteria of strong and weak AI
Strong Weak
Feasibility Human-level intelligence Human-level intelligence
of goals will be achieved in will be implemented only
machines within in some unimaginable
foreseeable time. future, or perhaps never.
Forms of All thought can be Most thought is
implemen- mechanized as sequential intuitive, not
tation logical reasoning from introspectable,
axiomatic descriptions non-logical, associative,
of the world. The approximate and
`physical symbol system `fuzzy': best modelled
hypothesis': all agents, by brain-like
including intelligent, ultra-parallel networks.
are best implemented
symbolically.
Personnel Vintage AI professionals, Members of other
e.g. Turing, Simon, professions, particularly
Newell, McCarthy, in linguistics,
Feigenbaum, Nilsson, and neurobiology, physics,
their followers. and philosophy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The labels `strong AI' and `weak AI' have sometimes been used
to dierentiate two schools. Criteria are summarized in Table
15.1.
The taxonomy in Table 15.1 lays emphasis on the `physical
symbol system hypothesis' of Newell and Simon (1976). Their
intended interpretation restricts symbol systems to those which
can transparently support communication with human users.
Thus the lists of numerical weights in which neural nets express
themselves constitute `symbols' of a sort, but not in the sense
intended by the above authors. This restriction has persuaded
some practitioners that the physical symbol system hypothe-
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sis excludes intuitive processes from AI's domain of discourse.
Such separatism is unsafe, since much knowledge-based thought
seems irredeemably intuitive and sub-articulate (for a recent
commentary see French, 1990). For its subcognitive processes,
there is no direct evidence that the brain employs a symbolic
regime. Hence those who accept subarticulate expertise as a
proper AI concern may wonder whether for this purpose they
should abandon symbolic representations as untrue to nature.
The present chapter advocates a dierent position, namely that
a conceptually transparent symbolic style oers a way of improv-
ing on nature. By representing intuitive processes symbolically,
inductive inference can do something which is both non-brainlike
and also highly useful, catering to the client who says: `My in-
house experts may be `intuitive'. But I want an expert system
to formulate its reasons more explicitly than that.'
2. KNOWLEDGE AND THOUGHT
In industrial knowledge systems the implementer has to distin-
guish between thought as something to be communicated and
thought as problem solving. Choice of representation remains
a developer's option. In implementing intuition, he or she may
decide that it is something over which to draw a veil. The veil
may be woven of neural nets, or of hand-crafted spaghetti-code,
or of something else. But suppose that the developer has to
supply the customer also with means to draw the veil aside, for
purposes of interrogation about goals, plans, evidence, justi-
cation, and the like. At the price of being less true to nature,
he or she might then be better o not to have veiled it in the
rst place. Like cognitive and brain scientists, knowledge engi-
neers also study the structure of expertise. Unlike cognitive and
brain scientists, they do this (or should do) for the purpose not
of emulating but of transcending the brain's limitations. First
among these is the relative inarticulacy of what both cognitive
scientists and knowledge engineers call `procedural knowledge',
thus distinguishing it from `declarative'.
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2.1. Declarative knowledge
It is characteristic of the retrieval and use of declarative knowl-
edge that it is ordinarily done in conscious awareness. From a
wealth of neurobiological observations concerning the eects of
brain lesions on memory, L. R. Squire (1987, chapter 11) distin-
guishes declarative memory from procedural as `memory that is
directly accessible to conscious recollection'. By contrast, the
hall-mark of a highly trained expert brain is that it does much
of its work intuitively. `Dialogue elicitation' of rules for building
expert systems may therefore be frustrated whenever a given
expertise involves strategies stored in procedural memory. Inac-
cessibility to consciousness of even parts of a targeted expertise
can then cause serious problems for large knowledge engineering
projects, such as Japan's ambitious `Fifth Generation' (Michie,
1988). Dierentiation of the two forms is thus desirable.
Declarative knowledge comprises whatever lends itself to log-
ical formulation: goals, descriptions, constraints, possibilities,
hypotheses. The declarative category also includes facts. When
these relate directly or indirectly to events in the agent's own ex-
perience, their place of storage is referred to as `episodic' mem-
ory. Another subdivision of declarative knowledge is held to
reside in `semantic' memory, which Squire denes as follows:
Semantic memory refers to knowledge of the world. This system
represents organised information such as facts, concepts, and vocab-
ulary. The content of semantic memory is explicitly known and avail-
able for recall. Unlike episodic memory, however, semantic memory
has no necessary temporal landmarks. It does not refer to particu-
lar events in a person's past. A simple illustration of this dierence
is that one may recall the dierence between episodic and semantic
memory, or one may recall the encounter when the dierence was
rst explained.
A school founded by John McCarthy (1959) aims to extend
formal logic to serve as a vehicle for mechanizing declarative
knowledge (see a recent collection edited by Ginsberg, 1987).
We will say little further about the project, beyond expressing
respect for such work. Its philosophical importance is matched
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only by its diculty. Our theme is closer to the name and nature
of expert systems. These are not so much to do with giving
computers knowledge of the world, as with equipping them with
useful know-how. In face of the diculties which confront the
McCarthy project, there is something to be said for separately
studying the mechanization of procedural knowledge and only
later integrating the two levels.
2.2. Nature of procedural knowledge
In Anderson's (1990) text on cognition, skilled procedures are
pictured as arising in part by derivation from pre-existing mental
descriptions. No direct evidence is oered. Knowledge engineers
concerned with real-time skills have been led by practical expe-
rience in a rather dierent direction. The empirical picture is
one of inductive compilation from sensorimotor data gathered
in the course of trial and error. In this picture the role of higher-
level knowledge is not to participate directly, but to steer the
learning process, setting and adjusting the frame within which
skill-bearing rules are constructed.
The nal phase of skill-learning, described by Anderson and
others as `automatization', does not ordinarily support intro-
spective report by the expert performer, hence the `knowledge-
acquisition bottleneck' of applied AI. Procedural knowledge, as
we have seen, limits itself to the `how to' of skilled tasks, whether
physical as in making a chair, or more abstract as in prediction of
sterling rates against the dollar or the diagnosis of acute abdomi-
nal pain. A common synonym for such knowledge is know-how,
and its manifestation in observable behaviour is called `skill'.
One diculty is that observed task-performance does not nec-
essarily reveal whether a given expert's behaviour really exem-
plies a skill in the procedural sense or whether he or she is
using declarative-semantic memory to form action-plans on the
y. Squire's earlier-cited denition supplies a test, namely the
ability to give a verbal account of the way in which each decision
was made, possible only for declarative memory. A second crite-
rion is the frequency of the recognize{act cycle: this may simply
be too fast for `what-if' inferential planning to be feasible.
For those concerned to recover procedural rules, as in build-
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ing expert systems, lack of verbal access (on which Anderson
also remarks) is a problem. Yet there is widespread faith among
knowledge engineers that special methods of `dialogue elicita-
tion' can be found which will permit the construction of rule-
based systems on the scale of such inductively built systems
as the GASOIL (Slocombe et al., 1986) and BMT programs of
Table 15.2.
Is rule induction from expert-supplied data nevertheless in
some sense a second-best option for building systems on the
BMT scale? On the contrary. Experts can rapidly and eec-
tively communicate their skills (as in the BMT case) solely via
illustrative responses to selected cases. Does he or she thereby
omit something indispensable? Certainly the practitioner's ex-
plicit and communicable awareness is basic to expertise in some
task domains. But other domains, which lack this property,
can be found not only among a rather wide variety of industrial
tasks, but even in such purely `mental' forms of expertise as
playing a strong game of checkers (see below).
As a paradigm of procedural knowledge, Feigenbaum and
McCorduck (1983, p.55) give the example of tying one's shoes.
It is interesting that once this skill has reached the stage known
as automatization it can continue unaected by destruction of
the individual's brain mechanisms for acquiring and handling
important forms of declarative knowledge. Damasio describes a
patient named Boswell. The following summary is from Patricia
Smith Churchland (personal communication).
In addition to losing the hippocampal structures, he has massive
damage to frontal cortex. He can identify a house, or a car, but
he cannot identify his house or his car; he cannot remember that he
was married, that he has children, and so forth. He seems to have no
retrograde episodic memory, as well as no anterograde episodic, ...
Boswell can still play a ne game of checkers, though when asked he
says it is bingo. He cannot learn new faces and does not remember
`pre-morbid' faces such as that of his wife and his children... Boswell
can play checkers, tie his shoes, carry on a conversation, etc.
Of considerable interest is the survival of Boswell's check-
ers skills. Evidently what we shall later term `fast' skills are
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Table 15.2. Of the world's three largest expert systems the two lat-
est (GASOIL and BMT) were not constructed from rules obtained in
dialogue fashion, but by automated induction from expert-supplied
data. In each case the induction engineer trained the system in the
desired skill in the style that the master of a craft trains an appren-
tice, by a structured sequence of selected examples. Rates of code
production are typically in excess of 100 lines of installed Fortran,
C, Pascal, etc., per programmer day. The methodology allows vali-
dation to be placed on a user-transparent basis (Michie 1989), and
maintenance costs are in many cases trivialized. Tabulation is from
Slocombe et al. (1986) with 1990 data on BMT added. The BMT
program is described on p.10 of Pragmatica, vol. 1 (ed. J.E. Hayes
Michie), Glasgow, UK: Turing Institute Press.
APPLICATION NO. OF DEVELOP. MAINTENANCE INDUCTIVE
RULES MAN-YRS MAN-YRS/YR TOOLS
medical
MYCIN diagnosis 400 100 N/A N/A
VAX
XCON computer 8,000 180 30 N/A
conguration
hydrocarbon
separation ExpertEase
GASOIL system 2,800 1 0.1 and
conguration Extran 7
conguration
of 1st Class
BMT re-protection >30,000 9 2.0 and
equipment in RuleMaster
buildings
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not the only ones for which procedural knowledge may domi-
nate over declarative. In contrast to chess skill, checkers was
already known not to lend itself to the planning approach and
to be essentially `intuitive'. When A.L. Samuel was engaged in
his classic studies of machine learning using the game of check-
ers, he had numerous sessions with leading checkers masters di-
rected towards dialogue acquisition of their rules and principles.
Samuel reported (personal communication) that he had never
had such frustrating experiences in his life. In terms of rela-
tionship to what the masters actually did, the verbal material
which he elicited contained almost nothing which he could use
or interpret. In similar vein, Feigenbaum and McCorduck (loc.
cit., p.82) describe this type of expert response in the following
terms: `That's true, but if you see enough patient/rocks/chip-
designs/instrument readings, you see that it is not true after all.'
They conclude `At this point, knowledge threatens to become
ten thousand special cases.'
The message from clinical studies is that skilled performance
of even sophisticated tasks can still be manifested, and learned,
when the brain is so damaged that knowledge of new happen-
ings cannot be retained and previously stored facts and relations
(declarative-semanticmemory) are seriously disrupted. Another
circumstance under which the mediation of declarative mem-
ory is at least equally disabled can be observed in the normal
brain by imposing a suciently restrictive constraint on the time
available for the recognize{act cycle, as in touch-typing. This
skill does not depend on the storage and retrieval of declarative
knowledge, and can be acquired and executed in its virtually
complete absence. Recall that when copy-typing at speed the
typist does not need to understand the words as he or she reads
them. Indeed, after a speed test little or nothing of the text's
content can be recalled. Moreover, educated onlookers are sur-
prised, although they should not be, by the outcome of a request
to the typist (supposing that he or she has been using a type-
writer with unlabelled keys) to label the keyboard correctly with
the proper alphanumeric symbols. Lacking a declarative model,
the touch-typist is ordinarily unable to do so (see, for example,
Posner, 1973), other than by deliberately typing a symbol and
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observing where the nger went!
Simon (in press) has recently re-emphasized that simple recog-
nition of a familiar object takes at least 500 milliseconds. Opera-
tions involving reference to a semantic model of the task domain
require retrieval from long-term memory of relatively complex
knowledge-structures and an associated apparatus for inferring,
storing, and utilizing intermediate results. Such elaborate trans-
actions are to be found only in the `slow lane'. Here seconds,
minutes, or even hours are required to incubate a decision. The
bare bones of an explicit rationale for a slow-lane decision, when
it comes, can usually be elicited from the expert by verbal re-
port. Not so in the fast lane, to which the present discussion
is conned. `Fast' skills cannot be accessed by `dialogue elici-
tation' methods. How then are expert systems to be built for
these skills? A solution is to record behavioural traces from
the expert subject. Inductive inference then reconstructs from
recorded decision-data rule-based models of the brain's hidden
strategies. As reported in this review, machine execution of
data-derived models has been found to generate performance
exceeding in reliability the trained subject's own.
2.3. Postulates of skill acquisition
Experimental work which will now be described was animated
by a point of view about brains, summarized below as a list
of postulates. Declarative knowledge is abbreviated to `D' and
procedural to `P'. P designates only procedural knowledge which
has already reached the automatized stage.
1. human agents are able verbally to report their own D;
2. human agents cannot verbally report their P;
3. D can be augmented by being told, and also by deduction;
4. P is built by learning, whether by imitation or by trial and
error;
5. P can be executed independent of D, but not vice versa;
6. decision-taking via P is fast relative to use of D;
7. suciently fast control skills depend on P alone;
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8. even for some slow skills P is sucient for expert perfor-
mance; rule-induction can extract an explicit form of P
from behavioural traces.
Experiments on dynamical control have yielded illustrations
of the listed postulates, culminating in a test of 9 above, namely
induction of rules from silent brains. But a comment is rst
requisite on the undoubted existence of expert systems (EXCON
was mentioned earlier) whose rule-bases have, with whatever
diculty, been constructed by dialogue acquisition.
Many observers have noted that experts seek to escape from
the requirement of rule-formulation (which they nd unconge-
nial) by supplying `rules' of such low-level form that they con-
stitute no more than concocted sample cases, i.e. specimen
decision-data. The phenomenon has been described by Sterling
and Shapiro (1986) in their description of the construction of a
credit evaluation expert system. The nance specialists contin-
ually gravitated towards concrete instances rather than general
rules. This has indeed been a universal nding in knowledge
engineering, in line with the known facts concerning procedural
memory and its mode of access.
But what if knowledge engineers in search of improvements
on raw formulations were consciously or unconsciously to apply
their own powers of inductive inference to such sample cases?
They could then themselves create the kind of high-level rule
structures that they had hoped to elicit. The result would of
course be testimony more to their own powers of inductive gen-
eralization than evidence that experts can introspect their own
rules. In a recent aerospace application two knowledge engineers
were able, by deliberately exploiting this style of `rule-conjecture
and test', to construct a rule-based solution with no more than
a black-box simulator of the task domain to provide corrective
feed-back. No set of rules pre-existed, either in an expert's brain
or anywhere else.
3. AN EXPERIMENT IN RULE-BASED CONTROL
The role of the systems developer postulated above requires only
a reactive oracle. This source need not be an expert. Indeed, it
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need not be human. As will be described it could be a simulator
on which the developers can play `what-if' games with their
latest conjectured rules (what if we modify the rules like this?
... what would result from that adjustment? ... etc.). In an R
& D contract for a US space consortium Sammut and Michie
(1991) were given access to just such an interactive oracle.
When building a controller for a physical process, traditional
control theory requires a mathematical model to predict the
behaviour of the process. Many processes are either too compli-
cated to model accurately or insucient information is available
about the process environment. Space-craft attitude control is
an example of the latter. The client was interested in the devel-
opment by machine learning of a rule-structured controller. A
check was desirable as to whether dynamical control tasks can be
satisfactorily handled by production rules at all, whether these
are captured by learning algorithms or developed in some other
way.
If the attitude of a satellite in low Earth orbit is to be kept
stable by means of thrusters, the control system must inter-
act with many unknowns. For example, although very thin,
the Earth's atmosphere can extend many hundreds of kilome-
ters into space. At dierent times, the solar wind can cause the
atmosphere's density to change, thus altering the drag and aero-
dynamic torques on the vehicle. These are factors which earth-
bound designers cannot predict and even after three decades of
space ight, attitude control is still a major problem.
The client required a trial of rule-based control, using a com-
puter simulation of an orbiting space-craft under `black box'
conditions. By this is meant that knowledge of the simulation's
structure and parameters was unavailable to the developers and
hence to the controller. Constraints and assumptions included
minimal human supervision. Only one ground station was to
be used for control. The ground crew therefore have only a 16-
minute window in each 90-minute orbit during which they can
communicate with the space-craft. A premium was thus placed
on the controller's aptness for generating intelligible reports.
The client's `black box' simulated three-axis rigid body atti-
tude control with three non-linear coupled second order dieren-
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tial equations, and was supplied as Fortran object code. The use
of pseudo-random generators introduced various time-varying
disturbances, not only concerned with aerodynamic eects of
solar wind variations and of atmospheric density and altitude
changes, but also eects of propellant expenditure, payload re-
distribution, solar array articulation, extension and retraction of
the gravity gradient boom and the motion of robotic and other
on-board manufacturing appliances. Due to such unpredictabil-
ities and to the possibility of a failure while out of communica-
tion with the ground, interest in a rule-based back-up controller
centred on robustness, simplicity, and conceptual transparency.
The BOXES adaptive rule-based control algorithm (Michie
and Chambers, 1968; Chambers and Michie, 1969) was recently
the subject of new work by Sammut (1988) who also reviewed
trials of other algorithms for learning rule-based solutions to the
`pole and cart' problem. A rigid pole is hinged to a cart which is
free to move along a track of xed length. The learning system
attempts to keep the pole balanced, and the cart within the
limits of the track, by applying to the cart a force of constant
magnitude but variable sign, either right or left (`bang-bang'
control). The pole and cart system is characterized by four
state variables which make up a four-dimensional space. By
dividing each dimension into intervals, the state space is lled
by four-dimensional `boxes'. With each box (i.e. local region of
state-space, or `situation' in the terminology of situation-action
rules) is associated a setting which indicates that for any point
within the given box the cart should be pushed either to the left
or to the right. Essentially this representation was tested on the
client's simulated spacecraft.
3.1. The black box
The task was to drive the system from its initial state to the
specied nal state and maintain that state. Included in the
black box was a fourth order Runge{Kutta numerical algorithm
which integrated the dynamics of the equations of motion. The
time step had a xed value of 10 seconds. The black box kept
track of time and randomly injected various time-dependent dis-
turbances as earlier described.
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The state variables:
Attitudes: yaw (x), roll (y), pitch (z)
Body rates: !
x
, !
y
, !
z
.
Initial values of the state variables:
x = y = z = 10 deg
!
x
= !
y
= !
z
= 0.025 deg/sec
The desired state:
x = y = z = 0  3 deg
!
x
=!
y
= !
z
= 0.005 deg/sec
Failure conditions:
x or y or z exceeds  30 deg
!
x
or !
y
or !
z
or exceeds  0.05 deg/sec
A ag is turned on if any of these go out of bounds.
Available control inputs:
Torque: T
x
, T
y
, T
z
.
Torque was applied by the ring of thrusters which were
aligned to the body axes. Although other attitude control de-
vices (momentum exchange systems) will be used on the satel-
lite in addition to thrusters, this work only addressed the use of
thrusters. The following are minimum and maximum torques
which can be applied by the thrusters:
T
x
(Min) = T
y
(Min) = T
z
(Min) = 0 ft-lbf
T
x
(Max) =  0.5 ft=lbf; T
y
(Max) = T
z
(Max) =  1.5 ft=lbf.
3.2. The rules
The rst trial was made by directly adapting a set of BOXES-
derived rules from the pole-and-cart domain to a sequential logic
suggested by hand-derived rules due to Makarovic (1987, 1991).
In each recognize{act cycle rule-matching follows a certain pri-
ority order, cycling through the state variables until an action
is selected. For each in turn the rule rst checks that the rst
derivative does not exceed certain bounds. If it does, then a
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force is applied to oppose it. If it does not, then with respect
to the same variable check its magnitude. If it exceeds given
bounds then a force is applied accordingly.
In the case of the pole and cart, there was a clear priority to
the order in which dimensions were checked. It was critical that
the angular velocity and the angle of the pole were considered
before the cart variables, since neglect of the pole leads to failure
much more rapidly than neglecting to keep the cart away from
the ends of the track. If this principle is applicable to the case
of the space-craft then it is necessary to determine which of the
state variables changes most rapidly. This was done, yielding
rules expressible in `if-then-else' form, thus:
if !
z
< -0.002 then apply a T
z
of +1.5
else if !
z
> 0.002 then apply a T
z
of -1.5
else if z < -2 then apply a T
z
of +1.5
else if z > 2 then apply a T
z
of -1.5
else if !
y
< -0.002 then apply a T
y
of +1.5
. . . and so on ...
Note the use of `bang-bang' control, i.e. the torquers were set
either fully positive or fully negative just as in the pole-balancing
experiments. With a space vehicle there are three dimensions,
not one, to which a control motor (torquer) can apply a posi-
tive or negative thrust, corresponding to the yaw, roll, and pitch
dimensions of rotation respectively. The thresholds for the vari-
ables were determined by choosing an arbitrary value slightly
within the bounds given for the desired values of the variables.
This control strategy proved to be successful but slow, requir-
ing 8700 seconds to bring the vehicle within desired bounds, and
it also consumed 11.2 units of propellant. The question arose
whether the control of each dimension could be decoupled. The
cited rule only allows one thruster to be red at any one time. If
each axis of the craft were considered separately then all three
thrusters could be red simultaneously. This modication re-
sulted in rules which brought the vehicle under control very
quickly, requiring only 4090 seconds. But propellant consump-
tion, although improved, was still too high, using 7.68 units
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Table 15.3. A decision array for control of the yaw dimension.
Yaw too-
positive T
x
=4 0 -T
x
=4 -T
x
=2 -T
x
Yaw OK T
x
=2 0 0 0 -T
x
=2
Yaw too-
negative T
x
T
x
=2 T
x
=4 0 -T
x
=4
Yaw-rate Yaw-rate Yaw-rate Yaw-rate Yaw-rate
too-neg. negative OK positive too-pos.
before the vehicle became stable. Therefore a partial retreat
was made from pure `bang-bang', with a view to replacing it
with ner control of the thrusters.
The resulting strategy is best understood by a decision ar-
ray. For example, yaw control can be displayed as in Table 15.3
and the resulting performance as in Figure 15.1. Each of the
15 boxes corresponds to one control rule. Thus the box in the
top left hand corner states that if the yaw is positive (i.e. above
the bounds on the desirable yaw) and the yaw rate !
x
is well
below the bounds of desirability then apply a quarter of the full
torque in the positive direction. Thresholds were set for an-
gles at 2 deg and for angular velocities they were 0.002 and
0.003. The decision arrays for roll and pitch dimensions were
of the same form. The resulting control behaviour was highly
satisfactory. The pitch dimension was the slowest of the three
to be brought within the desirability zone.
The client's engineers stated that both in speed of recovery
and in propellant expenditure results were close to calculated
optima. Since however it appeared that the satellite had greater
inertia in the z-axis (pitch) than in the other two the thrust of
the z-torquer was increased. This brought the vehicle under con-
trol in 5290 seconds, somewhat more slowly than the previous
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Figure 15.1. Plot over time of vehicle's yaw behaviour (see text)
controller. But it only required 1.7 units of propellant, a sub-
stantial saving. Also calculations and simulations by the client's
engineers made the result appear slightly better than optimal.
This doubtless arose from minor approximations and/or distri-
butional assumptions made in their numerical work. Time did
not permit the point to be elucidated. But the broad conclu-
sion was seen as extremely encouraging. An industrial-strength
problem had shown that the simplicity, robustness, and con-
ceptual transparency of rule-based control does not have to be
purchased at the cost of signicant degradation of performance.
4. EXPERIMENTS WITH SKILL-GRAFTING
Supported by the freedom interactively to test each conjectured
modication on the simulator, Sammut and Michie found their
own powers of inductive conjecture adequate. But tasks of
higher complexity, such as remote control of pilotless aircraft,
would demand a less primitive approach. Present ideas are ori-
ented towards the industry's use of interactive simulators for
training pilots. A simulator-trained performer cannot tell you
his or her strategy, but can demonstrate it. What is demon-
strated can be automatically recorded. What is recorded can be
inductively analysed by computer. With psychology-trained col-
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leagues, Michael Bain, Jean Hayes-Michie, and Chris Robertson,
one of us (D.M.) engaged in an investigation into the use of the
rule-induction algorithm C4.5 (see Quinlan, 1987) to uncover
eective control rules from such behavioural records. Experi-
mental subjects were trained on an interactive simulation of a
task illustrated in Figure 15.2. Control was exercised through a
joystick of a pole-and-cart simulation which refreshed the screen
approximately 20 times per second. New results together with
earlier ndings with this experimental system (Chambers and
Michie 1969) lead to conclusions as follows (details are available
in Michie, Bain, and Hayes-Michie 1990).
4.1. Conclusions from pole-balancing
First conclusion: role of problem representation. Chambers and
Michie used two regimes of training, identical except for the
graphical animation seen by the subject. In one variant the
picture was as shown. In the other the subject saw only a display
of four separate horizontal lines, along each of which a pointer
wandered to and fro. The subjects in this second variant were
kept in ignorance of the nature of the simulated physical system.
Unknown to them, the pointers actually represented the current
status of four state variables, namely position of cart, velocity of
cart, angle of pole, and angular velocity of pole. Our hypothesis
was that when the system is run fast, leaving only time for
use and up-dating of procedural memory, then there will be
no dierence in the learning curves of subjects using the two
dierent representations. Although not explicitly reported in
their paper, an indication of this was observed by Chambers and
Michie. In recent work a rate was additionally used suciently
slow for subjects to report the task as having a major `planning'
component. This slow-trained group learned more slowly, at
least in the initial stages. In the new work trials have not yet
been made of the lines-and-pointers representation.
Second conclusion: induction of rules from behaviour. Ma-
chine learning by imitation of a trained human was rst shown
for the inverted pendulum by Donaldson (1960) and partially
reproduced under bang-bang conditions by Widrow and Smith
(1964). Our concern was to test the ability of modern induction
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Figure 15.2. Diagram of the pole and cart task
algorithms to extract from the behavioural record the kinds of
rules believed to accumulate in procedural memory during skill-
learning. Results have been positive. A task was investigated
where the object was to cross the centre of the track as often
as possible in an allotted time-span without dropping the pole
or crashing the cart. When induction-extracted rules were in-
stalled in the computer as an `auto-pilot', performance on the
task was similar to that of the trained human who had gen-
erated the original behavioural trace, but more dependable, as
described below.
Third conclusion: the clean-up eect. Rules induced from a
behavioural record can be assessed in two dierent ways. Pre-
dictive mode tests the ability of a rule-set correctly to predict
other behaviour sampled from the same source. Performance
mode tests the ability of the rules to substitute for the human
source in executing the skilled task.
Induced rule-sets performed satisfactorily in the second mode
while consistently showing high prediction error, often exceed-
ing 20 per cent. One of the team, Mr. Michael Bain, pointed
out that when watching a machine-generated rule-set's perfor-
mance on the screen one is struck by an appearance of super-
human precision and stability. A trained human skill, although
controlled by an equally precise and stable set of production
rules, is obliged to execute via an error-prone sensorimotor sys-
tem. Inconsistency and moments of inattention would then be
stripped away by the averaging eect implicit in inductive gen-
eralization, thus restoring to the experimenters a cleaned-up
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Table 15.4. Clean-up eect shown by induced control rules over a
5-minute test period. x = position,  = angle: `dot' denotes rst
derivatives. These results are typical, and have been many times
conrmed in test runs with the same, and with other, subjects.
x _x 
_

Trained human (ranges) 2.79 4.85 0.562 5.021
Induced rule (ranges) 0.46 1.83 0.134 2.276
Range dierences 2.33 3.02 0.428 2.745
`Clean-up' 83% 62% 76% 55%
version of the original production rules. When tested in predic-
tive mode, such a rule-set can do no better than the cumulative
sum of human perceptual and execution errors allow. But in
performance mode one would expect a super-reliable stereotype
of the behaviour of the human exemplar. Direct conrmation of
this idea was obtained by calculating the magnitude of the pole
and cart's excursions during a control session along each of the
four dimensions of the state space. Observed ranges tabulated
in Table 15.4 were obtained from a behavioural trace recorded
from Mr. Bain's own trained performance.
The ndings suggest that `skill-grafting' from behavioural
traces may be possible for more demanding tasks, such as those
encountered in aircraft ight control. The key idea is that if
we could look inside the head of the ground-based pilot of a re-
motely controlled aircraft, or of the on-board pilot of a dicult
vehicle such as a helicopter, we might see a neural encoding of
a fully sucient skill, but degraded in real-time execution by
sensorimotor delays and errors. Recovery of a logically equiva-
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lent rule structure and its transplantation to an error-free device
(i.e. to a control computer) then oers a source of enhanced and
more reliable performance. In advanced rotorcraft control there
is a current need for libraries of individual autopilot manouevres
(`circle at 50 feet', `y slowly sideways for one minute', etc.)
which the pilot could activate in dicult weather or other con-
ditions, so as to free his attention for some main task in hand,
visual search of water surface, target acquisition, etc.
4.2. Learning to fly
Sammut and colleagues have recently been able to reproduce
the `skill-grafting' phenomenon in the complex task of ying a
simulated aircraft (Sammut, Hurst, Kedzier, and Michie, 1992).
Using a ight simulator developed by Silicon Graphics, three
subjects trained themselves by repeatedly piloting a simulated
Cessna through the successive stages of a dened ight plan,
consisting of the following manouevres:
1. Take o and y to an altitude of 2000 feet.
2. Level out and y to a distance of 32 000 feet from the
starting point.
3. Turn right to a compass heading of approximately 330

.
4. At a North/South distance of 42 000 feet, turn left to head
back towards the runway.
5. Line up on the runway.
6. Descend to the runway, keeping in line.
7. Land on the runway.
Taking `events' as being signalled by the occurrence of con-
trol actions, then up to 1000 events were recorded per ight.
Each of three trained subjects performed 30 ights, so that the
complete data comprised about 90 000 events. For each event
the control action was recorded, together with values of state
variables measured at a moment selected 1{3 seconds earlier.
The `oset' makes approximate allowance for the pilot's delay
in responding to complex stimuli. To give a rough impression
of the data, the following are names of recorded variables:
boolean variables: on-ground, g-limit, wing-stall;
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twist, elevation, azimuth, roll-speed,integer variables:
climb-speed, fuel, thrust, aps;
real variables: E/W distance, altitude, N/S distance,
rollers, elevator.
The simulation program was modied to log the subjects'
actions during ight. Log les from trained subjects were used
to create the input to an inductive rule-learning program. The
learning program was Quinlan's (1987) C4.5. Its output took
the form of separate decision trees for each of the four dierent
control actions, further sub-divided into the seven stages listed
above. For example, to quote from the original paper,
The critical rule at take-o is the elevator rule:
elevation > 4: level-pitch
elevation  4
airspeed  0: level-pitch
airspeed > 0: pitch-up-5
This states that as thrust is applied and the elevation is
level, pull back on the stick until the elevation increases to
4

. Because of the delay, the nal elevation usually reaches
11

which is close to the values usually obtained by the pilot.
`pitch-up-5' indicates a large elevator action, whereas `pitch-
up-1' would indicate a gentle elevator action. The other
signicant control at this stage is aps:
elevation  6: full-aps
elevation > 6: no-aps
Once the aircraft has reached an elevation angle of 6

, the aps
are raised.
The 28 decision trees were automatically converted to C-code
routines, arranged as a suite of seven ight control modules, each
responsible for all aspects of a given stage. A new module was
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invoked as soon as a pre-programmed precondition was satised
for the onset of the next stage. Within each module, four sets
of if{then rules separately supervized the four separate control
actions.
An autopilot was generated in this fashion from each of the
trained subjects. Tests were made by running the simulator in
autopilot mode, substituting as autopilot code one or another
of the three inductively synthesized program suites. The en-
tire ight plan was executed with conspicuous competence, but
with individual mannerisms characteristic of the ying styles of
the individual human data source. Indications of the `clean-up
eect' (see earlier) were also evident, particularly during the
approach stage.
4.3. Learning to fly straight
What is the signicance of the foregoing experiment? Primarily
that a suitable decomposition of the problem allows the skill-
grafting methodology to be scaled up. Inductive skill-grafting
evidently is not just applicable to pole-balancing but also to
more complex domains such as ight control.
The same workers also reported indications of the `clean-up'
eect earlier found in the pole-balancing experiments, but these
indications were of a preliminary nature only. We now report
a more detailed examination of this phenomenon independently
conducted by Camacho (1992) using a more challenging ight
control task. He used a computer simulation (ACM public-
domain software down-loaded onto a Sun Sparcstation 2) of the
F-16 combat aircraft. Using Quinlan's C4.5 (see Quinlan, 1987)
decision-tree induction package Camacho not only found that
clean-up was operating, but was also able to show that in his
experimental context it played a very large, almost dominating,
role.
Camacho followed a similar methodology to that of Sammut
et al., details being as follows.
Flight plan stages:
1. Take o.
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2. Climb to 1500 feet.
3. Reduce climbing angle and thrust attaining level ight at
2 kilo-feet.
4. Fly parallel to the runway's long axis for a distance of 200
kilo-feet.
5. Turn left 270

.
6. Turn right to line up with the runway.
7. As soon as distance to runway is less than 70 kilo-feet,
start descent to runway keeping in line.
8. Land on the runway.
Variables sampled.
real: magnitude of airspeed (knots) (Geoparallel system)
real: y coordinate of airspeed (knots) (Geoparallel system)
integer: x position (ft) (Geoparallel system)
integer: y position (ft) (Geoparallel system)
integer: altitude (ft)
real: climb rate (ft/h)
real: g-force vector in acft system (only z coordinate)
real: roll rate (rad/sec)
real: pitch rate (rad/sec)
real: yaw rate (rad/sec)
real: heading (rad) /* Euler angles for acft */
real: pitch (rad) /* Euler angles for acft */
real: roll (rad) /* Euler angles for acft */
real: angle of attack (rad)
real: angle of sideslip (rad)
real: elevators setting (radl)
real: ailerons setting (rad)
real: rudder setting (rad)
real: elevator trim setting (NOT used)
real: aps setting (rad)
real: speedBrake setting (rad)
integer: throttle
boolean: gear handle
boolean: brakes
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Figure 15.3. The `clean-up' eect. Plotted lines show distances trav-
elled in the horizontal plane from take-o by human pilot (light lines)
and the autopilot (heavy line) using the ACM ight simulator of the
F-16 combat plane (see text): the y axis represents deviations in the
horizontal plane from straight ight.
boolean: afterBurner
Control commands used were: elevators, rollers, rudder, aps,
speed brake angle, throttle, gear handle (boolean), brakes (boolean),
after burner (boolean). Thus for each of the ight plan's eight
stages nine separate decision trees were synthesized.
From each of typically twenty missions, successive `state-
vectors' were sampled and written to le, making about 213
000 `state-records' in all. As a post-processing operation, be-
tween 1100 and 1600 `events' were then machine-selected from
each of these, making about 25 000 `events-records'. As in Sam-
mut et al., only those state vectors were selected which precede
by a xed interval in the le the subsequent record of a control
action. The set of events so constructed formed the `training
set' for inductive synthesis of a complete autopilot of the form:
ight plan plus 72 decision trees.
The earlier-mentioned clean-up eect became evident when
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Figure 15.4. Further measurements of the `clean-up' eect, see pre-
vious gure. The six thin-line plots represent the rst six missions
of a total of 20 own by the human pilot (R. Camacho) to form the
training set of about 25 000 events. The general appearance of the re-
maining 14 was very similar when plotted in the same way (see text):
x represents distance travelled in the horizontal plane from take-o;
the y axis represents deviations in the horizontal plane from straight
ight.
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autopilots synthesized according to the above formulation were
substituted for human control. The magnitude of this gain in
steadiness of control can be appreciated by a study of Figures
15.3 and 15.4, which relate only to one dimension, namely con-
trol of horizontal deviation from ight plan during the rst four
stages (straight-line ight on a constant bearing).
This has so far been the main result of an investigation still
in its early stages. It should be emphasized that on the other
criteria there are local stages of the total mission where improve-
ment is needed. In particular, probably because the human pi-
lot himself (R. C.) has not yet adequately mastered stage eight,
the autopilot induced from these records has not either. Self-
training, as well as autotraining, is currently continuing. Since
the foregoing was written, both human and clone have become
able routinely to land the simulated F{16 without mishap.
4.4. A Blackboard-like Model for Coordination Among Agents
In both of the ight control implementations reviewed above,
there is a two-level hierarchy of control: a high level `chairman'
(the ight plan) and a set of low-level `agents' (decision trees).
So far the only role played by the chairman is to monitor the
stage of ight and switch the subset of active agents according
to context (stage of ight). Each low-level agent has a very
specialized task of deciding upon one control in one given stage.
All active low-level agents have the same view of the situation
(inspect all the state variables) including access to the decision
values of their peer agents. Despite the two-level design of the
current controller there is no supervized coordination of the low-
level agents. How then is the work done?
There is a strong similarity between the community of low-
level agents and the AI paradigm of the blackboard (see Nii,
1986, for review). Each agent behaves like a blackboard's `knowl-
edge source' responsible for a specialized problem solving activ-
ity (decide one of the controls in one particular stage of ight).
The blackboard (shared memory) role is played by the variables
of the aircraft depicting the overall situation. Since all vari-
ables are visible to every agent the agents have the same view
of the situation and, most importantly, have information about
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their peer agents by watching their corresponding decision val-
ues in the `blackboard'. This latter facility is responsible for
the coordination among low-level agents. As an example, if the
rudder agent decides to change its value (moving the physical
rudder) the change will be noted on the `blackboard' and the
roller agent, seeing it, may compensate the banking eect of
the physical movement of the rudder. For achieving this co-
ordination eect the decision values of the other agents must
also be used as attributes during the learning phase. The chair-
man represents explicit knowledge that is easily articulated and
therefore can be hand-crafted. The specialist agents, on the
other hand, implement low-level real-time control skills that, in
a human, are not performed at a conscious level and therefore
cannot be articulated. To create this kind of knowledge, each
agent is separately derived by inductive learning from recorded
human performance of the skilled task | a step which is an
extension of previous blackboard models. The current imple-
mentation of the low-level agents may be eective if some small
variations to `normal conditions' appear (mild wind). But if
the wind is abnormally strong (serious exception to normal y-
ing conditions) then an understanding of the situation is needed
and possibly a reformulation of some current goal, like make a
slight change in the bearing to accommodate the wind compo-
nent in the nal velocity. Therefore to improve the skills of the
chairman and to incorporate planning capabilities, a deep model
(possibly qualitative, as suggested by Sammut (1992)) will be
needed and the capability of reasoning from rst principles us-
ing it. In a way similar to the human counterpart the computer
high-level agent should be silent most of the time, just moni-
toring the overall situation and making small corrections from
time to time. It should be fully activated only when the sit-
uation requires considerable replanning and deep reasoning for
dealing with exceptions for which the low-level agents have no
decision.
There is obviously a strong case for implementation of the
chairman in a logic programming language. Sammut (1992) has
suggested that the low-level agents should also be coded in a rst
order language and constitute a library of primitive actions that
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the high-level planner could use, setting values for parameters
and dening goals.
4.5. Conclusions from autopilot induction
Models extracted as above from decision-data by rule learning
are purely heuristic in form. They incorporate no explicit ref-
erences to time or causality. Yet as reviewed earlier, real-time
human problem-solving involves co-operation between two sep-
arate kinds of mental process driven from two separate mem-
ory systems, updated by separate kinds of learning. The di-
chotomy is recognized in AI under the labels `heuristic' and
`causal'. These roughly correspond to the neuropsychologist's
procedural/declarative distinction. The balance in practice is
set by the time-constraints imposed by dierent tasks. A fast
situation{action cycle allows time only for executing heuristics
and virtually none for reasoning about causes.
As the autopilot experiments demonstrate, complex skills can
be built entirely from heuristics. Bears can learn to ride bicy-
cles, and humans can y combat planes through mission phases
which allow no time for analysis. Under such circumstances,
everything goes by pattern-invocation. The formal identity be-
tween pattern classication and control then stands out clearly.
This identity has recently been discussed (Michie, 1991) in con-
nection with a denition of learning which says:
a learning system uses sample data (the training set) to generate
an up-dated basis for improved classication of subsequent data
from the same source.
The above-cited discussion continues:
Notice that the denition, although phrased strictly in terms of
classication, logically extends to acquisition of improved perfor-
mance on tasks which do not look at all like classication. Iterative
situation{action tasks come to mind such as riding a bicycle, solv-
ing an equation, or parsing a sentence. The extension becomes
obvious when for the decision classes we choose names which refer
to partitions of the space of situations as `suitable for action A',
`suitable for action B', etc.
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Why should one want, in addition to nding a machine-
ecient representation of the above mapping, to construct an
operationally redundant
superstructure to capture causal relations and to support `what-
if' planning? Answers suggest themselves as soon as one moves
to the more demanding denition which animates the charac-
teristically AI approach to learning:
a learning system uses sample data to generate an up-dated ba-
sis for improved classication of subsequent data from the same
source and expresses the new basis in intelligible symbolic form.
The requirement for social communication of the `improved
basis' now forces the issue. If synthetic autopilots are to show
`understanding' of ight situations and their own responses,
then however necessary heuristic models may continue to be
for the sub-structures of skill, insightful performance and ex-
planation at higher and more strategic levels demands causal
modelling of a sophisticated kind. It is towards this dicult ob-
jective that much work of the kind here reviewed is now turning
(see Bratko, 1991).
5. SUMMING UP
In the debate between symbolic and neural-net representations,
the two sides have tended to overlook the possibility that dier-
ent parts of the brain, specialized to address dierent purposes,
employ dierent representations. Specically such diering pur-
poses can be broadly grouped under two contrasted main heads:
(1) `run-time' thinking;
(2) communication of the process and its outcome.
For (1), there is no obvious biological reason to expect sym-
bolic representations to have evolved, in the sense in which
`symbolic' is here used. Indeed there is little evidence that
such structures are employed in the brain's real-time problem-
solving, some of which is critically supported by varieties of
visual and spatial reasoning associated with the brain's right
cerebral cortex, and by subcognitive procedures. But the so-
cial dissemination of knowledge and thought listed under (2) is
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of such predominant importance in our species that elaborate
symbolic mechanisms have emerged to support the execution
of this function. The evolutionary processes have partly been
biological and partly cultural. Eccles (in Popper and Eccles,
1987) paints a picture of divergent specialization between the
two hemispheres of the brain according to which the `minor'
(usually the right) hemisphere plays roles central to run-time
problem-solving, involving pattern-handling and spatial and so-
cial orientation. Yet this hemisphere almost wholly lacks ca-
pabilities of symbolic reasoning, notably those associated with
language and logic. The dominant (usually left) hemisphere, by
contrast, not only uently handles the decipherment of linguistic
and logical expressions, but is also the clearing-house for reports
on subgoal attainment during problem-solving. Eccles argues
that, although `consciousness' is also manifested by the right
hemisphere in the sense of a diuse awareness, the focussed and
organized forms of goal-oriented awareness which we associate
with `self' are functions of the left brain. More recently the pos-
sibility has been aired in neurobiological circles (see Benjamin
Libet's observations and associated discussion in Behavioural
and Brain Science, 1988-89) that the seat of consciousness acts
more as a news room than as a planning headquarters, putting
a coherent retrospective gloss on the consequences of decision.
The decisions themselves, in this model, emanate from activi-
ties localized elsewhere. An elaboration of this view has recently
been developed by Dennett (1992). Whatever the neural nature
of functions (1) and (2) above, modern brain science sees them
as operationally and topographically distinct. In such a view,
the mechanisms of (2) face a serious problem. Modules special-
ized to symbolic reporting must interface with dissimilar, even
alien, architectures if explanations of the `self's problem-solving
decisions are to be generated. When required to support the
more intuitive eld of real-time skills, the brain's explanation
module tends to fail, or resorts, when pressed by the dialogue-
elicitation specialist, to confabulation.
Are we, as engineers of cognition, obliged to burden intelli-
gent artifacts with similar problems? On the contrary, to do so
would seem the height of folly. Moreover, from such work as has
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here been reviewed, an alternative strategy is available. We can
treat expert sub{cognition as a `black box' from which articulate
models can be extracted. The product: symbolic models of sub-
symbolic behaviour, or, more concretely, machine-executable yet
articulate skills from `silent' brains.
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